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I.

Introduction

The Dickey-Lincoln School Hydro Power Project was authorized
by Congress in 1965.

Advanced engineering and design work was then begun

by the Army Corps of Engineering in early 1966.

Further detailed design

work was suspended in November, 1967 because .of Congress' failure to appro
priate further funds for design or construction.

However, it now appears

likely that Congress will include funds for continued design and engineering
work in its appropriations for fiscal year 1974-75.

Each year since 1967, the Corps has used indexes of construction
costs and other price indexes in order to update the estimates of construction
costs to reflect current cost and price conditions.

The Corps has also

revised and updated the estimates of hydro electric power benefits to
reflect changing economic conditions.

On the basis of the detailed

analysis done prior to 1967 and the subsequent revisions, the Corps
presently estimates that the ratio of total benefits to total costs for
Dickey-Lincoln is 2.6.

However, there are two major limitations to this

estimate of a benefit-cost ratio.

First is that the basic data and analysis

underlying the benefit-cost ratio are now alomost seven years old, and
the subsequent adjustments only imperfectly reflect changes in economic
techniques and methods used to calculate the benefit-cost ratio are faulty
in several important respects.

In this report, I will be able to deal only with problems of
technique and methodology.

The work reported below is also based upon the

1967 data as revised and updated by the Corps of Engineers.

However,

this work does apply different techniques and methods which are considered
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to be correct by economists

and shows that the consequence of applying

correct techniques and methods leads to conclusions about the economic
feasibility of the Dickey-Lincoln Project which are substantially different
from those of the Corps of Engineers.

Specifically, when appropriate

techniques are used, the "true" benefit-cost ratio is shown to lie some
where between 0.9 and 1.2 depending upon the assumptions made about key
variables.

The difference between . the high and low estimates of the

benefit-cost ratio is small compared to the range of uncertainty and
possible error stemming from the use of old and possibly outdated data.

There are three ways in which the techniques and methods used
by the Corps tend to overstate the degree of economic feasibility of
the Dickey-Lincoln Project.

First, the techniques used to calaalate

the benefits due to hydro electric power generation lead to overestimates
of hydropower benefits.

Second, the assumptions concerning the cost of

capital used in construction of the project lead to a substantial
underestimate of construction costs.

n d third,not all of the true costs

of the project construction are counted.

Specifically, the benefit-

cost analysis ignores the cost of environmental change and the losses of
recreation, fish, and wildlife values associated with a freeflowing un
developed river.

If the Corps' benefit-cost analysis is corrected to take

into account the first two points above, the revised benefit-cost ratio
is reduced to somewhere between 0,9 and 1.2.

Then, if due weight is given

to the environmental damages , it appears that they would tip

the scale

against the project construction.

It must be emphasized that the findings reported in this paper
are not definitive.

If funds for further design work and study are authorized

by Congress, the Corps of Engineers will be able to generate new and
more up-to-date data and analysis on costs and benefits.

In addition,

the Corps will be required by law to prepare and circulate an environmental
impact statement (EIS) "which will ensure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration
in decision making along with economic and technical considerations (National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969)."

The EIS must incorporate data on

economic benefits and costs as well as environmental benefits and costs,
and it must identify and evaluate alternative ways of meeting
objectives.

the project

When the Corps' studies are completed and the EIS circulated,
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independcnt analysts and other parties of interest will have substantially
more information for their debate about the merits of the project.

Since

these data are not presently available, the primary purpose of this report
is to illustrate the importance of using correct analytical techniques and

•

procedures in evaluating benefits and costs, and to focus attention on the
critical variables and components of the data.

The next section will outline the rationale for a benefit-cost
analysis and the principles to be used for defining and measuring economic
benefits and costs.

Subsequent sections will review and critically evaluate

the most recent benefit-cost analysis undertaken for the Corps of Engineers.

II.

The Principles of Benefit-Cost Analysis

In the most general sense, benefit-cost analysis is simply the
application of common sense —

no more, no less.

It means that whenever one

is confronted with a choice or a decision as to whether to undertake a course
cf action, he should identify and list all of the beneficial or favorable
consequences that will stem from taking that action and compare these with
all of the possible adverse consequences or costs of taking that action.

If

the beneficial consequences are perceived to outweigh the adverse consequences,
the action should be undertaken.

At this level of generality the only alter

natives to rational weighing of benefits and costs are the use of the
essentially arbitrary decision making rules (for example, always say no)
or random choices (for

example, coin flipping).:

Benefit-cost analysis might best bo seen as a scale or balance
where the benefits are piled on one tray, the costs are piled on the other
and the purpose is to see which way the scales tip.

However, this analogy

points to one of the limitations to applying the rationale of benefit-cost
analysis.

The objective application of benefit-cost analysis to decision

making requires that all of the benefits

and the costs be expressed and

measured in some common units , for example, weight in the case of the scales.

One of the major stated purposes of water resources development
projects is;to increase the overall efficiency of the economic system in
the use of resources such as labor, capital, and land in the production
of goods and services.

The appropriate scale or yardstick to apply to

projects undertaken in the name of economic efficiency is dollar values.

The

measure of the favorable effects of such a project would be the dollar
value of the goods and services produced by the project where values are
determined by or measured by the willingness to pay of individuals to
receive these outputs.

In many instances, the outputs of projects are not

sold in markets, so that dollar value or willingness to pay is not regu
larly observed or recorded.

For example, an individual would be willing

to pay something to use the road between his home and his workplace even
though no tollboQth has been set up to exploit that willingness to pay.
In these cases willingness to pay and value must be estimated or inferred
on the basis of other information.

Part of the art of benefit-cost

analysis is the development of these techniques for estimating values.

On the cost side, the appropriate measure is the value of other
goods and services which must be foregone or given up in order to
free the resources for utilization in this project.
of opportunity costs.

This is the notion

For.example, if a certain project requires a

year of work by a laborer, the cost is what that laborér would have
produced elsewhere if he had not been utilized in this project.
is the opportunity cost of labor.

That

In a market economy, the prices of

resources such as labor, capital, and land are usually accurate measures
of their opportunity cost.

But for some resource inputs, market values

are not available; hence opportunity costs must be estimated or inferred
on the basis of other information..

For example, if a hydroelectric project

"requires the damming of a free flowing

river,

lost or foregone in undertaking the project

one of the things that is

is the value of the recreation

al, fish, wildlife, and other environmental services provided by the river
in its natural state.

While these values are not readily measurable

in dollar terms, their loss is surely a cost which must be weighed against
whatever benefits the project is supposed to bring.

Benefit-cost analysis can be a truly reliable guide to making
• decisions on resource allocation only if all of the benefits and costs
aré'identified, measured, and placed in dollar units so they can be
weighed on the economist's scale.

Clearly this is a counsel of perfection

These conditions can never be met totally.

No benefit-cost analysis
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can adequately identify and measure all of the relevant variables.

This

does not mean that benefit-cost analysis should be scrapped as a guide to
decision making.

But also .it does not mean that benefit-cost analysis

should proceed by counting only those things for which dollar price
tags are available and ignoring those favorable and adverse effects
which cannot be readily expressed in dollar terms.

There is a middle ground which makes maximum use of the available
information.

This is first to provide an accounting of all the benefits

and costs which can be expressed in dollar terms, and second, to. accom
pany this with a description of and quantification of the other favorable
and adverse effects which are expected to stem from the project."*"

This

listing permits persons involved in the decision making process to identify
and

assess the non-economic consequences of economic decisions.

While an adequate listing of the non-economic eonsequences of under
taking the Dickey-Lincoln project is not yet possible, the National
Environmental Policy Act is meant to ensure that this information is compiled
and made available to persons involved in the decision making process.

III.

The Corps' of Engineers Benefit-Cost Analysis

On the basis of the earlier design and engineering studies updated
for changes in construction costs and prices over the last seven years,
the Corps of Engineers estimates that the dam and associat d power
facilities will cost $384,800,000 including interest during construction.
In addition, transmission facilities are expected to cost $129,100,000.
Half of the investment in transmission facilities is attributed by the
Corps to the Dickey-Lincoln project, i.e., the Dickey-Lincoln share is
$64,550,000.

The total construction cost for the facilities in current

dollars is estimated to b e :

1.
This is essentially what is called for by the Water Resources
Council in "Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related
Land Resources." This is also consistent with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act.
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Investment in dams and
generating equipment

$384,800,000
64,550,000

Transmission facilities
Total investment

$449,350,000

In most presentations of benefit-cost data, both the benefits
anc^ the costs are expressed in terms of annual flows or dollars per
year.

This requires that the total investment incurred at the beginning

of the project.

The annual equivalent of investment costs can be

interpreted as the amount required in equal annual installments to recoup
the initial investment plus interest over the life of the project.
The Corps assumes that the Dickey-Lincoln dam will have a useful life of
100 years.

They assume that interest would be charged at the rate of

3 1/4% per year.
tions.

The annual costs used below are based upon these assump

The annual benefits and costs as calculated by the Corps of

Engineers are as follows:

ANNUAL BENEFITS
The value of electric power
Flood control damages avoided
Recreation benefits
Redevelopment benefits
Total annual benefits

PER YEAR
$44,365,000
60,000
1,250,000
817,000
$46,492,000

ANNUAL COSTS
Annual equivalent of investment
costs plus operation, main
tenance and replacement
100 years at 3 1/4%
BENEFIT TO COST RATIO

$17,742,000

2.6

IV.

Review and. Critique

There are three major criticisms to be made of the Corps' benefitcost analysis.

The first concerns the technique for estimating, hydro

electric power benefits.

The second is the assumption concerning the

cost of capital of the interest rate used to.calculate annual project
costs.

And the third concerns the omission of the costs of environ

mental changes.

If it can be.shown that the electrical energy to be produced
by Dickey-Lincoln would be produced by some other source if DickeyLincoln were hot built, then the cost of producing electricial energy
from the alternative can be used as a measure of benefits of DickeyLincoln power.

This is because if Dickey-Lincoln were built, it would

not be necessary to use labor, capital, and other resources in constructing
and operating the alternative.

That savings in resources as measured

by the cost of the alternative is the benefit of using Dickey-Linooln
to generate the electrical energy. .

The proper application of the;"cost of alternative" technique for
estimating benefits requires both

the identification of an appropriate

alternative, and the correct measurement of the cost of that alternative.
The Corps of Engineers has assumed that in the absense of Dickey-Lincoln,
a combination of oilfired steam base load equipment in Maine and gas turbine
equipment in Boston would be the most likely alternative to meet existing
and projected changes in the demand for electric energy.

The Corps can be criticized for not considering a wider range of
alternatives both for providing increments to supply and for altering
the patterns of demand.

For example, a full investigation of the

economic feasibility of Dickey-Lincoln as a source of peaking power for New
England would require an investigation of the effect of peak load pricing
on the load curve and the growth in electricity demand.

If peak load

users were charged something approaching the marginal costs they impose on
the system, it is possible that changes in the time pattern of electricity
demand would make additional investments in peaking capacity such as
Dickey-Lincoln unnecessary.

Also some less conventional supply alternatives
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should be investigated, including

the recent suggestion that sustained

yield management of the forestry area
Lincoln could produce enough wood fuel

proposed to be-flooded by Dickeyto support an equivalent sized

steam generating facility at competitive cost,
of this paper to analyze these alternatives.

it is beyond the scope
It should be noted, however,

the Corps is required by law to investigate and evaluate the full range
of alternatives as part of its environmental impact statement.

The proper measurement of the cost of the alternative requires
an understanding of the distinction between real
costs.

costs and financial

Real costs are the opportunity costs of the labor, capital, and

other resources actually used in the construction and operation of the
alternative.

Financial costs are those money payments.that are recorded

on the books of the constructing and operating agency.
of a particular facility
that facility.

The real costs

are independent of who constructs and operates

But financial costs of a given facility can vary depending

upon the identity of the operating agency.

For example, if a privately

owned utility company builds a generating facility, it must pay substantial
amounts in realy property taxes to the local taxing authority.

An

identical facility owned and operated by a public agency will be tax
exempt.

The realy cost of the two facilities would be-the same, but the

financial costs are different.

It is the real costs of the alternative

facility which are relevant as .a measure of the benefits of a hydro
electric development such as Dickey-Lincoln.

' ■

The Corps assumed that the alternative to Dickey-Lincoln v/ould be
privately owned.

In calculating the cost of this alternative, the Corps

included substantial amounts of federal and local taxes —
but not real resource costs.

financial costs

The Corps also included the cost of insur

ance in its measure of cost of alternatives.

This is legitimate in that

insurance represents a cost of bearing the risk of possible accidental
loss or damage.

However, no comparable charge for. insurance was included

in the cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln.

Since the alternatives must

be evaluated on a comparable basis, either the insurance cost must be
deducted from the cost of alternatives or an additional charge for insurance
should be added to the cost of Dickey-Lincoln.

The latter procedure is

used below in a subsequent section where revised benefit-cost figures are
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presentecL

The cost of alternatives and therefore the estimates of hydro
electric power benefits are quite sensitive to the assumptions made
about the cost of fuel

oil used in the alternative.

The estimates

used by the Corps in their most recent evaluation were made in
January 1974 in.the.midst of great uncertainty about the future course
of fuel

oil prices.

It is essential that the benefits estimates be

revised to take into account the most recent data on fuel

prices.

And

it. would be desirable to present alternative estimates of hydroelectiric
benefits based on different assumptions about future oil prices.

.The interest rata or discount

rate used to convert investment costs

to annual equivalent costs may be the most important single variable
in deteriming the benefit-cost ratio for very long-lived investments
such as hydroelectric'dains.

The interest rate represents . the opportunity

cost to society of the capital used to build a project whiefi yields its
benefits over a long period of time.

The best measure of the cost of

capital to society is the rate of return or interest that the capital
could earn if placed in some alternative investment.

Most economists agree that the best measure of this opportunity
cost is the rate of return on investment in the private sector of the
economy.

Although there is some disagreement as to the precise figure

most economists would agree that this rate of return and the discount
fate which should be used in benefit-cost analysis lie somewhere between
8%. or ,10%.
r

. . .

• ’ ■:

Federal policy governing the choice of a discount rate for use in
benefit-cost analysis has been a

major source of political controversey.

A high discount rate used in project analysis ieads to high estimates
of project costs and low benefit-cost ratios.
rates has the opposite effect.

Federal

The choice of low discount

policy established in 1962 based

the discount rate on the coupon interest rate of outstanding long term
U.S. Treasury securities

(Senate Document 97).

Because of a technicality of

federal law ., the only long term government securities outstanding during
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the 60's were issued during the late 1940's and earlier.

Because of

the unusual money market conditions of the time, all of these securities
carried unusually low coupon rates.

As a consequence the discount

rate used in evaluating projects during the 60's, including DickeyLincoln, reflected the unusual money market conditons of twenty years
before and bore ;no relationship to current money market conditons or
opportunity; costs of capital.

This.situation would have been .substantially corrected if the
Proposed Principles and Standards for Planning . Water and Related
Land Resources ratified by President Nixon in September, 1973, the
Water Resources Council retreated to the position

that "the govern

ment's investment decisions are related to the cost of federal borrow
ing," and established the discount rate for the evaluation of new projects
at 6 7/8% (Water Resources Council, 1973,,

PP. 34784, 24822).

Even this retreat was not enough for Congress.

The Water

Resources Development Act of 1974 further lowers the discount rate
to be used in evaluating projects which have not yet been authorized
s'

'

by Congress.; The Act also includes the so called "grandfather clause"

.

which requires that all subsequent evaluations of projects which have
once been authorized by Congress be analyzed using the discount rate in
force

at the time of Congressional authorization^

Since Dickey-Lincoln

was authorized in 1965 under the old policy, the discount rate to be used
for current evaluation and analysis must still be the outdated and
quite unrealistic 3

1/4%.

As will be shown below, if the discount rate of 6

7/8% recommended

by the Water Resources Council is used, and other appropriate adjustments
are made,

Dickey-Lincoln is only marginally justifiable on narrow

economic grounds.
below one.

Higher discount rates push the benefit-cost ratio

And if a 10% discount rate reflecting the true opportunity

cost of capital is used, the project would be clearly unjustifiable
on economic grounds alone.

2

2.
Since one of the real costs of construction is interest during
construction, use of a higher discount rate would also mean a higher total
investment. The results reported below do not include this adjustment.
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The third major criticism of the Corps' benefit-cost ratio is
its failure to reflect all of the opportunity costs of constructing the
dam and in particular the opportunity cost of diverting a free flowing
river and its associated wildlands and forests to hydrological stoarage
purposes.

As was argued above,

it is essential that even those costs which

cannot be valued in monetary terms must be identified and quantified
where possible so that decision makers can be aware of them and weigh
and assess them in relation to the measured economic benefits in their
dollar dimension.

The Corps of Engineers will be compelled to provide

information of this kind as part of their project evaluation when they
draw up an environmental impact statement for Dickey-Lincoln.
In addition to the three major criticisms raised above, there are
several points to be made concerning
estimated by the Corps.
control benefits.

the other components of beneifts

The Corps estimates $60,000 per year in flood

These benefits are measured by the expected value

of flood damages avoided by the construction of the dam.

This is an

appropriate'measure of flood control benefits provided that the dam
structure is the least costly method for preventing the economic damage
to the flood threatened areas.

However, if alternative flood damag 2

prevention measures can provide equivalent protection at a cost of
less than $60,000 per year, then the cost of the alternative is the
appropriate measure of flood control benefits.

As part of its project

analysis and environmental impact statement, the Corps will have to
consider alternative means of providing the flood protection to Fort
Kent and neighboring areas. •'
The second largest class of benefits identified and measured by
the Corps is recreation opportunities on the lake.

The Corps estimates

an average use of approximately 833,300 recreation-days over the life
of the project.

They assume a value per recreation-day of $1.50 yielding

total recreation benefits of $1,250,000 per year (Corps of Engineers
Letter dated April 26, 1974).
It is difficult to know what to make of this estimate.

There are

analytical techniques for predicting future recreation use at potential
sites.

But it is unclear whether the Corps used any of these techniques
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in arriving at their projected figure for use.

In the absence of any

documentation, for their estimate, it is difficult to take it at face
value.

Given the distance of the site from major population centers,

the low population of the immediate area, the relatively low quality of
the recreation experience to be provided, and the availability of many

.

superior quality, locations for flatwater recreation within the state,
it seems likely that the 833,300 recreation-days per year is a sub3
stantial overestimate of recreation use.
Also the unit value assigned by the Corps requires further examination.
There are analytical techniques for estimating a willingness to pay per user
day on the part of individual recreationists.

However, these techniques are

difficult and time consuming to apply to individual sites.

As a substitute

the Water Resources Council "Principles and Standards" authorized
project analysts to assign a unit value to general recreation experiences of
between $0.75 ;—

2.25 (Water Resources Council, 1973, p. 24804).

The

choice of value within that range is to be made on the basis of th'. quality
of the site which would include distance and accessibility) and availability
of substitute or alternative recreation sites.

In the case of the Dickey-

Lincoln lake , these considerations would appear to argue for a unit
value

toward the lower end of the range.
Finally the Corps counts as redevelopment benefits a portion of

the wages to be paid for constructing the project and during early years
of operation, arguing that some of these wages will go to workers,presently
unemployed or underemployed within the project area.
ment is acceptable.

The logic of the argu

The opportunity cost of utilizing a presently

unemployed worker in the construction of the dam is zero.

This fact can

be reflected either by a downward adjustment of estimated construction costs,
or by assigning an offsetting benefit of wages to unemployed workers.
However, the estimates of the numbers of unemployed and underemployed
workers available for the project were based on labor market surveys done
seven or eight years ago.

The corps will have to make a new survey to

determine the present labor market conditicr.3 in this area. ■Furthermore
the logic of the argument also compels us to look for possible

offsetting

3.
Since isolated numbers are difficult to interpret without some
frame of reference for comparison, the following figures are provided
to put the Corps' estimate in perspective. The visitor-days at Acadia Nat'l
Park in 1970 totalled 2,300,000; while visitor-days along the Allagash
Waterway for the same year were only 37,000.

adverse employment effects in the region.

For example, if flooding of forest

land causes a reduction in employment in the wood products industries,
there may be offsetting unemployment effects which should be counted
against the redevelopment benefits.

If some workers in the wood products

industries experience prolonged periods of unemployment, i.e., if they
are unable to move quickly into alternative employment, then the net
effect of the project on unemployment in the region would be smaller than
estimated by the Corps.

And accordingly redevelopment benefits would

be reduced.

■V;

Revising the Cost-Benefit Ratio

In this section some of the major adjustments to the Corps of
Engineers figures that hre discussed above are made and the results
summarized.

The critical variable in the benefit-cost analysis is the

discount rate used as an estimate of capital cost.

In this section I

will present the revised benefit-cost ratios under two alternative assum
ptions:

the first being a dsicount rate of 5

7/3% as recommended in the

"Proposed Principles and Standards" of the Water Resources Council; and
the second being a discount rate of 8 3/4% which the Federal Power Commission
estimates as the cost of capital to the private utility industry.

The

8 3/4% discount rate is used here primarily because of the ready
availability of data o;f the cost of alternative electricity supplies
based on this discount rate.
At a discount rate of 6 7/8% and an estimated project life of
100 years, the annual equivalent of construction costs and operating,
maintenance, and replacement costs is $33,349,000.

The Federal Power

Commission has provided comparable estimates of the cost of alternative
sources of electrical energy also based on a discount rate of 6 7/8%
(Federal Power Commission Letter), January 29, 1974).

These cost

estimates do not include taxes or insurance for the private alternatives;
so they are

strictly comparable with the estimate of- the cost of the

hydroelectric project.

The hydropower benefits based on the cost of

the alternative are $37,304,000.

The ratio of hydro power benefits

alone to total project costs is 1.12.
We lack an empirical basis for revising the Corps' estimate of
recreation, flood control and redevelopment benefits.

However, it seems

more likely that these are overestimates of the true value rather than
underestimates.

However, utilizing the Corps' estimates of these other

benefits, the benefit-cost situation can be summarized as follows:

ANNUAL BENEFITS

PER YEAR

Hydro Power benefits
Recreation benefits
Flood Control
Redevelopment

$37,304,000
1,250,000
60,000
.:
817,000

Total annual benefits

$39,431,000

ANNUAL COSTS
Additional costs of environmental
damages

(value unknown)

BENEFIT

less than 1.18

TO COST RATIO

When the 8 3/4% discount rate is used, the annual equivalent of
4
costs is equal to $42,192,000.
The Federal Power Ccmmssion has also
estimated the costs of providing alternative, power with an assumed cost
of capital of 8 3/4%.

The FPC's estimate included the cost of taxes.

Their estimate of the cost of alternative is $43,802,000 (Federal Power
Commission Letter, January 29, 1974).

In order to make this figure

comparable with the cost of the hydro electric development, ,it is necessary
to deduct the financial cost of taxes from this estimate.
make a precise determination are not available.

The data to

However, the data in

Federal Power Commission Hydro Electric Power Evaluation make it possible
to make an approximate adjustment.

5

•

The cost of alternative power,

net of charges for taxes, was calculated to be $39,747,000.

Adding the

Corps' estimates of flood control, recreation, and redevelopment benefits
yields the following summary tables:

4. This includes $449,000 per year for insurance as recommended by
the Federal Power Commission.
See Federal Power Commission, 1968, p.80.
5. . Table 50 shows that perhaps over a third of the capacity cost of
the coal fired alternative is due to charges for federal, state and local
taxes. To be conservative, it was assumed here that one quarter of the
capacity charges for the gas turbine and oil fired systems were due to
charges for taxes.

-15ANNUAL BENEFITS

PER YEAR

Hydro Electric power benefits
Recreation benefits
Flood control
Redevelopment
Total annual benefits

$39,747,000
1,250,000
60,000
817,000
$41,874,000

ANNUAL COSTS
Additional costs of environmental
damages

(value unknown)

BENEFIT TO COST RATIO

less than 0.99

To summarize, in this section we have adjusted the estimates
of benefits and costs provided by the Corps to take into account the
proper procedure for defining and-measuring the benefits of hydro
power development and to reflect more accurately the opportunity cost
of capital.

Under assumptions most favorable to the project, i.e.,

a 6 7/8% discount rate and zero environmental
of be refits to costs is approximately 1.2.
bound estimate.

damages, the ratio

This is clearly an upper

The true figure would be less than this if the

environmental costs of the project could be included.

Under the more realistic assumption of an 8 3/4% discount rate,
the upper bound estimate of the ratio of benefits to costs is 0.99.
Taking into account the environmental damages and the possible over
statement of recreation benefits simply reinforces the conclusion that the
project is not economically justifiable at this discount rate.

And at

a 10% discount rate, the benefit-cost ratio would be substantially below
1.0.

The economic case for the Dickey-Lincoln project is hardly over
whelming.

In fact even under the most favorable assumptions, the

excess of benefits over costs is small compared to the possible errors
in the magnitudes of all variables due to a reliance on outdated data
and estimates from the 1966 and 1967 studies by the Corps.

This suggests

the need not only for further study, but also great caution before large
committments of environmental and economic resources are made.
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